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We can then add a new branch in our previous entity-relationship
diagram, increasing the number of phenomenological classes (as shown
in Fig. 1 here). Since private phenomena can be reproducible, periodic etc, more 4
types (f={13,…,16}) were added. These are private occurrence that can only
be registered by specific group of individuals, those endowed with the meta-observable
faculties. The full phenomenological set has now 16 elements and may be
called G set (F Ì G). For example, an NDE event may
belong f=14 or f=16 class.
The adjectives ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ are only applied to non-observable
events, since it is not possible to assert beyond any doubt that special devices
could not be constructed to register meta-observables occurrences (Bender, 1972;
Ellis, 1975; Baruss, 2001). In other words, it is not certain that
meta-observables could be converted into invisible occurrences in the sense of
Definition 1. According to our picture, meta-observables constitute a ‘fourth
phenomenological kingdom’ of Nature for which the same phenomenological
properties may be ascertained, but which are independent from the other two
groups (observables and non-observables).
 |
| Fig. 1 |
The existence of meta-observables gives rise to a new type of
anomaly (regardless of the cause):
Definition 9
(Private or type II)
Anomaly: the set of all occurrences belonging to
G-F.
Suppose that, due to a genetic mutation
or disease, a group of humans develops the ability to sense radio waves of a
certain frequency and intensity. Such capacity would be restricted to the group
and represent a meta-observable, initially taken as a private anomaly. If a causal
correlation were discovered, a theory could be possibly formulated to explain
the ability. In order to be successful, such theory should account for both the
phenomenological cause (radio waves) and faculty acquisition
(perhaps the ‘mutation of some cells into radio waves sensory cells’) and the
anomaly would be accepted. In our initial discussion about private anomalies,
we have seen that, paranormal occurrences manifest themselves as both public
and private events. The former are related to controversies on regard to
the phenomenological sources while the later are caused by the lack of theories
to account for the faculties granting the observations. Compare this with UFOs
occurrences: polemics is rooted in the lack of consensus about the sources,
since in genuine UFOs sightings, there is only limited skepticism about the trustiness
of witnesses and their sensorial faculties, including mental states. Therefore, we can conclude that private
anomalies are the hardest ones from the purely empirical perspective, because
they involve justification of the very senses that are responsible for their
apprehension.
Thus, it is also a logical fact that the task of creating good
theories for type II anomalies requires the preliminary and tacit acceptance of
the faculties without which it is impossible to apprehend the effects. Starting with the analysis
of ordinary observables, anomalies of this type will only be accepted as
genuine facts as theories appear to justify the use of human instruments capable
of their registration.
In an established scientific activity, there is a natural skepticism
whose purpose is to protect research programs, the so called ‘negative
heuristics’ of Lakatos (1980). Its purpose is to protect well established
research programs against malicious excerpts or unnecessary modifications of
the program core. Such skepticism is important because it gives stability for
research programs. In order to exist, the negative heuristic must also refer to
a predefined research program, with a predefined scope (object of study) and
language.
Regarding general anomalies, the situation is very different, since
many are not related to any stable research field. In fact, what is the conventional
research program to accommodate psychic faculties and their associated phenomenology?
Obviously, the fundamentals of the phenomenological G-F group rest upon
the ‘positive heuristic’ supporting the existence of meta-observable faculties,
as well as the causes of many unexplained sources. Skeptic groups invoke the so
called ‘scientific’ methodologies to invalidate or explain away anomalies.
Having no rule to play in the development of well-established research programs
(Popper, 1968; Kuhn, 1970), the ‘scientific method’ is invoked to deny
primarily the new faculties, when then the task of denying the external sources
become trivial. For such specific type of ‘skepticism of anomalies’, it is
impossible to accept any anomaly and much less the faculties supporting their
occurrence. According to these skeptics, a meta-observable event is, at its
best, a ‘subjective impression’ that stands against the ‘objective evidences’
corresponding, in our classification, to observable facts (j={1,…,4}). The
challenge of parapsychology and other disciplines created to study anomalies is
therefore twofold: to propose generalizing theories that provide good
explanations for both faculties and the phenomenological causes.
We have seen however that, to establish the fundamentals of what is
‘scientific’ solely on the basis of observable occurrences is a limited belief
given the existence of many non-observable and sporadic phenomena (most
elements of the F set) [1].
Thus the fundamentals of pure empiricism that gave rise to logical positivism,
are long considered defective (Quine, 1951; Joad, 1950). Given the existence of
sporadic and non-reproducible events, many evidences are sporadic and
uncontrollable, requiring time and special conditions to become manifest, thus challenging
purely inductive methodologies that demand laboratory replication. Such
sporadic and uncontrollable events are further disregarded by skeptics of
anomalies on account of being termed ‘contextual’. However, many occurrences in
Nature cannot be reproduced at will (irreproducible events), their occurrence
rate is unknown, so that the only sources of knowledge available are contextual
in nature. Proper accumulation and consistent historical registration
constitute the only method available in the lack of a theory to guide the
research.
Since for each anomaly a corresponding skepticism exists, using
Definitions 4 and 9, we can distinguish between two kinds of skepticism: one
with regard to the phenomenological sources and another denying the faculties
required to apprehend and record private anomalies. The first type is weaker
than the second, since in the case of private anomalies, the acceptance of
extended faculties is necessary. It is then easy to understand the enormous
popularity of the ‘theories of hallucination’ of ‘self-delusion’ among skeptics
who deny the faculties, thus facilitating the task of providing any other explanation
for the causes.
[1] Take, for example, the
‘discovery’ of planet Uranus by Leverrier and Adams (Kowal, 1980, Kollerstrom,
2009), or the
proposal of the anti-electron by P. A. Dirac. (1928). If it were not for the
theories, no extraordinary evidence could be found to support the mere
suggestion of their existences.
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